humanitarian organization (HO), private sector (PS), non-profit organization (Balcik et al., 2010) . 63 And it is almost impossible for a single stakeholder to fulfill the needs of the affected people and 64 infrastructure rebuilding (Akhtar et al., 2012) . Further, the achievement of sustainable 65 performance relies on information transparency, enhanced communication and trust, which 66 results from the coordinated supply chain design (Kunz and Gold, 2015) . In this context, it is 67 necessary to adopt an effective way (e.g. stakeholder approach) to improve the sustainability of 68 HSC from the viewpoint of organizational coordination.
69
Given the complexity of business environment and the participation of various stakeholders, 70 the directors of a firm should take into account various stakeholder groups instead of merely 71 focusing on the interests/expectations of themselves. In this circumstance, stakeholder approach 72 is devised to manage the independence among serval stakeholders by balancing different 73 interests/expectations (Freeman, 1984) . Specifically, identification of stakeholders, analysis of logistics. In addition to that the coordination is also motivated by non-economic benefits (e.g.
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brand images, corporate social responsibility and staff motivation) (Balcik et al., 2010) . On the M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D 
Model formulation

308
To present a comprehensive overview of various factors, the following parameters (Table. 2) 309 are summarized here. In this paper, a discrete strategy game is captured by coordination and non-coordination 312 strategy. Four coordinated modes (Fig. 1) are developed from the cross tabulation of such 313 strategies. Moreover, it was identified that mutual collaboration was the most effective way to 314 achieve the sustainability of SHSC (Dubey and Gunasekaran, 2016).
Fig. 1 The coordinated modes between PSs and HOs in SHSC 317
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
To propose the EGM, four coordinated modes are discussed here. In this model, both PSs 318 and HOs tend to maximize their returns when they choose the coordinated strategy. (1 + ߙ ଵ )ܴ . To obtain such returns, necessary costs ‫ܥ‬ (see Table. 1) should be paid. For HOs, is that mutual collaboration is the best situation to improve the whole performance of the 335 coordinated system (both PSs and HOs), and it was validated by Dubey and Gunasekaran (2016) . 336 Besides, the coordinated costs ‫ܥ‬ should be paid by HOs. With regard to PSs, extra returns ߨ 337 can be obtained from opportunistic behavior (see Table. 1) and "free rider" problems as a result 
342
According to the aforementioned statements, the return matrix is shown in Table. 3. 
343
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Coordinate (x) (1 + ߙ ଵ )ܴ − ‫ܥ‬ ; (1 + ߚ ଵ )ܴ − ‫ܥ‬ (1 + ߙ ଶ )ܴ − ‫ܥ‬ ; ߨ + ܴ Non-coordinate (1-x) ߨ + ܴ ; (1 + ߚ ଶ )ܴ − ‫ܥ‬ ܴ ; ܴ
The replicator dynamics system and equilibrium points
345 Based on Table. 3, the expected returns of PSs that adopt coordination strategy are:
The expected returns of PSs that don't adopt coordination strategy are:
The average expected returns of PSs under the mixed strategies can be denoted by:
Based on the EGM, the expected returns of a strategy selected by one player are higher than the average expected returns of the population, and the strategy will spread in the population (Chen et al., 2018) . Thus, the replicator dynamics system denoted by the differential equation can be used to describe the frequency of such strategies.
Similarly, the replicator dynamics system of HOs is presented by: indicates that an unfair coordination strategy is only adopted by HOs.
379
Scenario 4:when‫ܥ‬
an interesting and reasonable situation including two equilibrium points ‫)0,1(ܣ‬ and ‫)1,0(ܤ‬ 381 will exist in the replicator dynamics system (Fig. 2d) . In this context, the ESS is uncertain, and it 382 will be discussed next.
383
Scenario 5 (Fig. 2e ): when ‫ܥ(‬ + ߨ ) ܴ ⁄ < ߙ ଶ < ߙ ଵ and ‫ܥ(‬ + ߨ ) ܴ < ߚ ଶ < ߚ ଵ ⁄ , an 384 expected state will exist in the coordinated game, which indicates coordination is an optimal 385 strategy for both PSs and HOs. As such, mutual coordination is the best way to achieve the 386 sustainability of HSC, and it was validated by Dubey and Gunasekaran, 2016. Table. 4.
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Table. 4 The return matrix of the game with consideration of trust mechanism 433
Humanitarian Organization (HO) Collaborate (y)
Non-collaborate (1-y)
Private Sector (PS)
Collaborate (x) (1 + ߙ ଵ )ܴ − ‫ܥ‬ ;
The replicator dynamics system and stability analysis
434
Based on Friedman (1991), the replicator dynamics system of PSs is denoted by:
The replicator dynamics system of HOs is: 
Computational results regarding the traditional mechanism
459
In this subsection, the uncertain scenario concerning two ESSs is only discussed here. 460 Moreover, due to the similar strategy adopted by PSs and HOs, for the sake of briefness, the 461 possibility of {coordinate, non-coordinate} strategy is only analyzed here. collaboration between PSs and HOs, the trust mechanism is considered here.
537
It is reported that trust is an important asset for coordination (Lu et al., 2018) . In addition, The following conclusions can be summarized. Firstly, when the trust action is only taken 546 by one actor, the trust mechanism has a limited influence on their coordination, which is 547 exhibited in Fig. 8 (a) and (b). More precisely, the coordination strategy is more likely to be 548 adopted by the actor without taking the trust action, while the defection strategy is commonly 
Highlights
Organizational coordination problem regarding sustainability of disaster is considered.
Stakeholder approach is employed to promote partnership between private sector and humanitarian organization.
Coordination mechanism is captured by quantitative method of evolutionary game model.
Both traditional and trust mechanisms should be considered in the design of coordination mechanism.
